As we enter a new era of economy, consumers data has now become both the currency used to purchase products and are assets to data-driven companies, such as firm Google and Facebook. Big data grant firms an abundance of information on consumer behavior, product differentiation, to market segmentation. Further, it provides firms the insights on the necessary innovations and quality of their products and/or services, even data privacy; all of which are elements of non-price competition and are subject to qualitative assessment in determining a firm’s position and strength in zero-price market. Unfortunately, the answers to the questions on how competitive a firm’s ownership of big data as well as how it imposes an entry barrier to relevant market remains blurred as competition law hasn’t yet adapted to the new business model, yet ever it poses risk of exclusionary conduct, tying, or price fixing. Thus, this thesis aims to provide a better clarity on the issue, specifically on the role of non-price competition in assessing a firm’s dominant position and the risks of anti-competitive conducts in big data ownership.